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Abstract
Korea’s mean gender earnings ratio between 1971 and 1983 remained virtually stagnant at 47
percent.  Then, after 1983, the earnings ratio took a distinct turn upward. When controlling for
education, the analysis reveals a surprising drop in relative earnings across education groups during
the 1970s and early 1980s, and a recovery thereafter.  This paper uses an extremely rich micro-data
set that is highly suitable for performing decompositions to explain the trends in Korea’s gender
earnings differential.  Results indicate that a strong compression in market returns to skills and
narrowing gender differences in education and experience explain most of the 1983 reversal.
1Introduction
Despite real GDP growth rates that averaged 9 percent per year in the 1970s and early 1980s,
Korea's mean gender earnings ratio remained virtually stagnant at 47 percent.  Then, after 1983, the
earnings ratio took a distinct turn upward. When controlling for education, the analysis reveals a
surprising drop in relative earnings across education groups between 1971 and 1983, and a recovery
thereafter.  How can we explain this widening differential between male and female earnings in the
earlier period, and the narrowing after 1983?  The answer to this question has strong implications
for the types of human capital, including the level and quality of education, in which Korean women
may choose to invest.  Women's investment choices will in turn affect the future productivity of
Korea's economy.
Changes in macroeconomic conditions and labor market policies provide an overall context
for understanding the dip and the subsequent recovery in earnings ratios across education groups.
The early 1980s mark the resumption of growth following the 1979 oil crisis, the 1980-81 Korean
recession, and the ensuing adjustment period (Mazumdar, 1993). As renewed growth generated new
employment opportunities, the government relaxed its quotas on the number of college students,
leading to a flood of new college graduates in the labor market and a compression in the returns to
schooling.  The government further relaxed controls in the labor market in 1987 by liberalizing
collective bargaining procedures.  This reform of the industrial relations system, a part of the overall
democratization in Korea, led to greater strike activity and union organization (Fields, 1994).
Another labor policy change that affected women's employment and earnings was the 1987 Gender-
Equal Employment Act, partly meant to rectify Korea's extremely segregated occupational and
industrial structure.   As noted in Amsden (1990), industrial segregation by gender is common in1
2developing countries, but it is more extreme in Korea.
This paper uses an extremely rich micro-data set from 1971 to 1992 that is highly suitable
for performing decompositions to explain the trends in Korea’s gender earnings differential.  Results
from a fairly standard cross-sectional decomposition indicate that women's relative progress in such
observed characteristics as education and experience play an important role in the 1983 reversal.
However, a large and growing portion of the earnings disparity between men and women remains
unexplained.  Other developing country studies typically stop here and attribute this growing residual
gap to increased wage discrimination by gender.   This study contains a more detailed trend analysis2
that separates changes in market returns to skills, which have little to do with discrimination, from
the residual gap.  Because men have more education and experience than women, any drop in the
returns to education and experience causes average male earnings to fall relative to women’s
earnings.  Results from the trend analysis indicate that a strong compression in market returns to
skills and narrowing gender differences in education and experience explain most of the 1983
upward turn in women’s relative earnings. 
The Data
The study uses micro-data from Korea's Occupational Wage Survey, an establishment survey
conducted annually by Korea's Ministry of Labor since 1970.  The data set is quite comprehensive
by developing country standards, with detailed information on individual workers' educational
attainment, actual labor market experience, occupation, industry, and region.  The surveys cover all
industries up through 1986, after which agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing are excluded.  This
change in sampling procedure in 1986 does not appear to cause a significant change in the types of
3non-farm enterprises covered by the survey.  To test for such compositional changes, I constructed
a battery of sample statistics on average real earnings by gender across various education, industry,
and experience classifications.  There are no noticeable spikes in these figures to indicate differences
in the coverage of non-farm enterprises.  Surveyed establishments must employ at least 10 workers
and are selected by a stratified random sampling method.  The surveys, in their exclusion of workers
in small enterprises, the self-employed, family workers, temporary workers, and public sector
workers, represent approximately one-half of Korea's total non-agricultural labor force (Choi, 1993).
I use data for 1971, 1976, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1989, and 1992, where the samples for each year are
randomly drawn from the original surveys. 
This study's sample consists of non-farm workers aged 15 to 65 with positive reported
earnings and hours worked.  Exclusions cause me to drop no more than 2 percent of the randomly
selected samples in any given year.   Earnings are defined as reported monthly base earnings plus3
monthly overtime earnings, and the earnings data are top coded for just two observations in 1976.4
Although some survey questions changed over the twenty year span, I could construct the same
variables for every year at the cost of dropping interesting variables (such as skill level, marital
status, and union membership) contained in later years but not in earlier years.   Females constitute5
approximately 37 percent of the sample in each year.  The largest drawback to the data set is its
limitation to individuals already employed.  Hence, I cannot control for any selection effects that may
overstate female earnings and understate the gender earnings differential.6
Earnings Ratio Trends and Explanations
The analysis begins with a description of how Korea's female-male earnings ratio has evolved
Eit  Xitit  vit .
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(1)
over time.  First I construct unadjusted earnings ratios, which simply compare average reported
earnings for women and men.  To adjust the ratios for differences in hours worked, I estimate, by
education categories, the following log-earnings equation for male and female workers in year t
(where i=m,f, and subscripts for individuals are omitted):
The notation E  is the natural logarithm of monthly earnings, denotes an nxk-dimensional matrixXitit
of observed characteristics,   is the k-dimensional column vector of regression coefficients, and vit it
is a white-noise error term assumed to be normally distributed with variance  .  Observed2i t
characteristics include log monthly hours worked; a binary variable for part-time; binary variables
for education level attained; potential experience (age, minus years of education, minus six) and its
square ; establishment-specific tenure and its square; binary variables for occupation-specific7
experience ; the percent female in each occupation; and binary variables for supervisor,8
establishment size, industry, and location.   The variable definitions and mean values by gender are9
found in Appendix Tables 1 and 2.  Following the procedure in Blau and Beller (1992), I evaluate
equation (1) for each gender-education group at the male means for the time variables, and at own-
group means for remaining variables.
Table 1 reports the unadjusted and adjusted earnings ratios for the entire sample and by
education groups.  The table shows that between 1971 and 1983, the total unadjusted earnings ratio
remained virtually stagnant at 47 percent, and after 1983 it took a sharp upward turn.  However,
controlling for education differences by separating workers into education groups reveals an erosion
in relative earnings across groups in the 1970s and early 1980s, particularly for more highly educated
5women.  Earnings ratios exhibit a recovery after 1983 for all groups except college and above, whose
recovery begins after 1986 and coincides with the even sharper upward turn for the other education
groups.  Despite these recoveries, by the end of the period, women with high school and college
educations had still not recovered their 1971 levels of relative earnings.  The adjusted ratios lead to
similar conclusions, with equally dramatic losses in the earlier period for women with high school
and above.  Because on average women worked more hours than men, predicting female earnings
with male hours worked causes the adjusted ratios to be smaller than the unadjusted ratios in most
years.
Figure 1 provides a framework for describing four determinants of the reversal in the trend
for Korea's gender earnings differential.  I examine these determinants with descriptive statistics in
the remainder of this section and with a more formal analysis in the decomposition sections.  The
first explanation appeals to gender differences in observed characteristics.  Sample means in the
Appendix point to a strong improvement in female educational attainment relative to males, which
helps to explain the recovery in the aggregate earnings ratio.  The sample means indicate that in
1971, 51 percent of females and 27 percent of males had primary school or below; these shares fell
to 12 percent for females and 4 percent for males by 1992.  Women made substantial gains relative
to men in attaining high school and college educations, especially after 1983.  However, the data do
indicate a growing gap between males and females in average job spells and in occupation-specific
experience during the 1970s and early 1980s.  These growing differences could explain the declining
earnings ratios across education groups during the early period.
Another factor that may have worked against women, particularly before 1983, is a growing
concentration in low-wage industries such as clothing, textiles, and leather, and in low-wage
6occupations such as clerical and sales work.  The evidence on whether industrial and occupational
segregation increased during the period is mixed.  Table 2 presents changes in Korea’s non-
agricultural employment structure for men and women from 1971 to 1992.  Within manufacturing,
female workers demonstrate a strong relative move from low-skilled jobs in textiles and apparel to
higher-skilled jobs in electrical and electronic machinery.  In 1971, 56 percent of all female
manufacturing workers were employed in textiles and apparel, compared to 36 percent by 1992.
Although men also moved out of this sector, their shift was less dramatic than that of women, which
in turn led to a reduction from 68 to 60 percent in the share of textile and apparel workers who are
female.  Among occupations, women gained much ground in the higher-paying professional and
technical occupations but lost ground in the administrative and managerial positions.  The relative
losses in managerial jobs are also reflected in the sample means, which indicate a sharp relative
increase for males in supervisory occupations, especially between 1971 and 1983.  Finally, Table 2
reports that both men and women experienced a sizeable shift from production to service
occupations.  This partly reflects what Cho (1994: 100) refers to as the “3D” syndrome: “a strong
tendency on the part of workers to avoid difficult, dangerous, and dirty jobs.”  Largely a result of the
influx of new female labor market entrants, the female concentration of clerical, sales, and other
service occupations grew sharply.
As illustrated in Figure 1, changes in unobserved characteristics may also explain Korea's
earnings ratio patterns.  This category includes relative changes in the unmeasured skills of male and
female workers as they age, relative changes in the unmeasured skills of new labor market entrants,
or changes in wage discrimination by gender (unequal pay for equal skill).  A growing gap in
unobserved characteristics due to any of these reasons would cause women to lose ground when
7ranked in the male residual earnings distribution, which controls for observed qualifications.  Table
3 reports that this outcome has indeed occurred.  The first column shows alternative percentile
rankings in the female residual earnings distribution.  The columns thereafter show women's
positions for each year in the male earnings distribution, after controlling for gender differences in
measured characteristics.  For example, one interprets the first cell as indicating that a woman with
average female earnings falls 38.4 percent of the way up the male residual earnings distribution.  In
other words, after controlling for differences in observed qualifications, a woman who ranks close
to the 50th percentile of the female distribution ranks at only the 38th percentile of the male
distribution.  Table 3 documents a sharp erosion between 1971 and 1992 in the mean female position
in the male residual earnings distribution.  The decline occurs for both upper and lower quantiles,
and results are similar for all education groups except college and above.  Consistent with the
declining earnings ratios until 1983, most of the erosion in the female position occurs between 1971
and 1983.  The most highly educated women actually experienced a considerable improvement in
their ranking up through 1983, and a small setback thereafter. 
The final two explanations in Figure 1 for the trend in Korea's gender earnings differential
encompass changes in the distribution of market payoffs to observed and unobserved skills.
Appendix Table 3 provides strong evidence of a narrowing in the returns to observed skills, as
measured by earnings regression coefficients for men.  The returns to a college education fell by
more than half, with much of the decline occurring after 1983.  This finding is consistent with Kim
and Topel (1995), who show that improvements in educational attainment resulted in a substantial
compression in the returns to schooling: as the supply of college graduates increased relative to that
of less educated workers, their relative wages dropped.  An important reason why the supply of
8college graduates rose so sharply, particularly during the 1980s, is a series of government measures
relaxing quotas on the number of college students.  The government had originally imposed these
quotas to boost the quality of a college education, reduce the concentration of students in urban
centers, and enhance the employment prospects of college graduates (Kwark and Rhee, 1993).
Because relatively more men had college educations, the particularly large drop in the college wage
premium after 1983 caused average male earnings to fall relative to women’s earnings and
contributed to the recovery in the gender earnings ratio.
Appendix Table 3 also reports a decline in experience premiums and a flattening over time
in the age-earnings profile, as reflected by the coefficients on the potential experience variable.  This
again is consistent with Kim and Topel (1995), who argue that the decline in relative wages for older
men constitutes another dimension of the narrowing in the male wage distribution.  The table further
shows a declining wage penalty, especially after 1983, for the occupational percent female, and a
declining wage premium after 1980 for being a supervisor.  These findings are supported by evidence
in Kwark and Rhee (1993), who find that occupational wage dispersion narrowed as occupational
mobility in both directions increased.  The coefficient estimates also reveal a falling premium for
working in a larger firm, which is consistent with findings in Aw and Batra (1996) for Taiwan.
However, the table does report a growing premium during much of the period for working in heavy
manufacturing industries.  This could reflect increased wages over time for workers employed in
industries that experience more rapid technological changes (Choi, 1993).  
To illustrate changes in the returns to unobserved characteristics, Table 4 reports the
dispersion in male earnings, controlling for compositional changes in the male work force.  One
interprets each cell in the first row as the difference in log earnings between men in the 90th and 10th
Eit  Xitit  itit ,
Eft  Xftmt  mtft .
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(3)
percentiles of the male residual earnings distribution; other rows have a similar interpretation.  Table
4 indicates a substantial decline in residual earnings inequality, where the 90-10 spread fell by .43
log points between 1971 and 1992.  This accounts for approximately 65 percent of the change in total
male earnings inequality, a result consistent with Kim and Topel (1995).  The next two rows indicate
that the narrowing occurred more strongly between the median and lower conditional quantiles,
although men in the upper conditional quantiles also experienced a decline in earnings inequality.
The next three rows, which show the 75-25 spread, indicate that this broad trend is not driven by
changes solely in the tails of the distribution.  As will be illustrated shortly, any narrowing in the
distribution of male residual earnings should help to close the gender earnings gap.
Explaining the Reversal: Methodology
This section examines the four explanations more formally with two decomposition analyses.
The first procedure utilizes individual years of cross-sectional data.  By standardizing the error term,
I can rewrite equation (1) as
where  , the standardized residual for males (i=m) and females (i=f), is distributed normally withit
mean zero and variance one for all t.  Next, I reweight the female earnings equation using the
coefficients and standard deviation from the male earnings regression as follows:10
By using these "male prices," I am predicting the average earnings females would receive, given their
E
mt  Eft  (XmtXft)mt  mt(mtft) .
Et  Xtmt  mtt .
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(4)
(5)
observed qualifications, if they were paid like males.  This methodology follows convention in the
literature in using male wages, with the implication that they better reflect the labor market payoffs
for productivity characteristics.   The gender earnings differential can then be written as11
The left-hand side of equation (4) is the total log-earnings differential between males and females.
On the right-hand side, the first term is the explained gap (the portion attributed to gender differences
in observed characteristics).  The second term is the residual gap (a function of unobserved prices
and the error terms).  When evaluated at the means, the residual gap is based on the level of male
residual earnings inequality ( ) and the mean female's position in the male residual earningsmt
distribution ( ). ft
Although the residual gap is commonly attributed to wage discrimination by gender, it may
encompass changes in returns to skills that have little to do with discrimination.  The more detailed
trend decomposition allows us to better understand the composition of this residual earnings gap and
hence the behavior of the aggregate earnings differential.  This second procedure continues from
equation (4).  Letting  denote the male-female difference within a year in the variable that follows,
one can rewrite equation (4) as
Using equation (5), the rate of change in the gender differential between any two years, t and s,
becomes
Et  Es  (XtmtXsms)  (mttmss) .
Et  Es  (XtXs)ms  Xt(mtms) ms(ts)  (mtms)t .
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(7)
Choosing year s as the base for prices by adding and subtracting X   and    produces thet ms ms t
following trend decomposition equation:
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (7) measures changes in observed characteristics,
holding prices fixed.  The second term captures changes in returns to these characteristics.  The third
term reflects changes in the position of females in the male residual earnings distribution, due to
changes in unobserved characteristics.  The final term measures changes in residual male earnings
inequality, or changes in the returns to unobserved skills.  In the analysis, I use the average across
all years as the base year to avoid possible extremes within any given year.
Figure 2 illustrates how a narrowing in the distribution of male residual earnings affects the
gender earnings differential.  The figure depicts a narrowing in the dispersion of male residual
earnings from  in period 1 to  in period 2, and it holds constant , the percentile f( )m1 m  f( )m2 m f1
ranking of a woman with average earnings in the male residual earnings distribution in period 1.
One can see that the decline in male residual earnings inequality leads to a reduction in the residual
earnings gap between men and women, from gap  to gap .  More women have earnings that rank1 2
toward the lower end of the male distribution.  Therefore, women effectively receive a higher wage
reward for their given positions in the male distribution when male residual earnings inequality
lessens.
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Explaining the Reversal:  Results
Table 5 reports the cross-sectional decomposition results for earnings differentials evaluated
at the sample means for all variables in every year.  The results are reported as male-female gaps
measured in log points, where each gap may be converted to a ratio of geometric means by
exponentiating its negative.  Hence, the relatively stagnant earnings gap from 1971 to 1983 in the
top row corresponds to the flat earnings ratio in that period, and the decline in the earnings gap after
1983 corresponds to the recovery in the earnings ratio.  Table 5 shows that gender differences in
observed characteristics explain a smaller proportion of the aggregate log-earnings gap over time.
Among observed characteristics, gender differences in education and experience account for most
of the explained gap, and these differences between men and women narrow considerably, especially
after 1983.  Differences in time inputs and location account for a minimal share during the period
and are not reported.  The small contribution of regional disparities in explaining the earnings gap
is consistent with findings in Lindauer (1985).  
All education groups except college and above show a similar pattern, where differences in
observed characteristics explain a falling share of the log-earnings gap.  The fall is most pronounced
for workers with primary school and below.  The unusual pattern for college and above reflects the
earlier result that college educated women actually improved their ranking in the male residual
earnings distribution.  Interestingly, the explained shares for the middle school and high school
groups decline the most after 1983.  The main conclusion to draw from Table 5 is that shrinking
differences between men and women in observed characteristics, especially education and
experience, play an important role in the upward turn in women’s relative earnings after 1983.
13
However, the analysis cannot pinpoint why a large and growing portion of the gap for most
education groups remains unexplained.
Results in Table 5 are consistent with three benchmark studies on Korea.  Using a similar
sample and methodology, Lee and Lindauer (1991) explain 60 percent of the aggregate gender
earnings differential in 1971 and 44 percent in 1986.  My inclusion of occupation, industry, and
location characteristics accounts for the large difference between the explained shares in Table 5 and
those in Lee and Lindauer.  Bai and Cho (1992) explain 63 percent of the differential in 1984 and
58 percent in 1989, and Lee (1991) explains 66 percent of the gender earnings differential in 1982
and 60 percent in 1988, again lower than the estimates in Table 5.  All three studies make claims
about the trend in wage discrimination based on the residual gap estimates without examining the
residual gap more closely.
Table 6, which reports the trend analysis results, allows us to better understand the
composition of the residual earnings gap.  The table divides the 1971-92 period roughly in half and
presents the results for 1971-83, 1983-92, and the period as a whole.  Intuitively, 1983 makes sense
as a break point because it marks the reversal in the earnings ratio trends.   In Table 6, negative12
values indicate reductions in the log-earnings gap over the specified period, while positive values
indicate increases in the gap.  One can see from the top row that the aggregate earnings gap stagnated
until 1983 and narrowed sharply thereafter, by almost 3 percent per year.  The subsequent
decomposition generates a clean result at the aggregate level:  women gained much ground in both
sub-periods through a strong reduction in the dispersion of market payoffs to skills, as indicated by
a narrowing in both observed and unobserved prices.  The narrowing is even stronger after 1983.
This result is consistent with Kim and Topel's (1995) finding that a narrowing in the returns to skills
14
is the most important reason for the total decline in male wage inequality, more so than
compositional changes in male productivity characteristics.  
However, women lost ground in both sub-periods due to a widening gap in unobserved
characteristics, especially in the earlier period.  Women also lost ground in the earlier period due to
an increasing differential in observed qualifications, which was driven by growing differences in
years of experience, not educational attainment.  As noted earlier, women actually made substantial
progress relative to men in their educational attainment.  The main conclusion to draw from the
aggregate results is that after 1983, shrinking gender differences in education and experience worked
together with a strong narrowing in returns to skills to finally outweigh the growing gap in
unobserved characteristics.  This led to the sizeable reduction in the earnings differential after 1983.
In the remainder of Table 6, I control for educational attainment by dividing workers into
education groups.  Once we control for women’s relative progress in education, the total earnings
gap between 1971 to 1983 for each group no longer stagnates but actually grows larger.  All four
groups report a strong reduction in the gap after 1983.  The aggregate decomposition results hold for
all education groups except college and above: namely, in both sub-periods women were helped by
a substantial narrowing in observed and unobserved price dispersion, but they were hurt by a sharp
increase in the gender gap in unobserved characteristics.  This growth in the residual gap is
particularly strong for those with less education.  The primary school, middle school, and high school
groups vary the most in the contribution of years of experience.  While workers with the least
education had diminishing gender differences in experience through the entire period, workers with
more education had increasing experience differentials.  These three education groups exhibit a
common trend in the contribution of industry and occupation, where gender differences led to wider
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earnings gaps from 1971 to 1983 but smaller gaps thereafter.  The most robust result across these
education groups is the important role of a compression in observed and unobserved prices in
explaining the recovery of women’s relative earnings after 1983.
As we saw earlier, women with high school and college educations report an increase in the
total earnings differential for the 1971-1992 period.  However, the decomposition results for college
and above are different from those of other education groups.  This group reports a sizeable increase
in the earnings differential during the first sub-period, driven mostly by a growing gender gap in
occupation and industry characteristics.  This result partly reflects the increasing tendency of well-
educated males to attain highly paid supervisory positions relative to their well-educated female
counterparts.  Unlike women in other groups, college educated women were helped by only a very
small narrowing in the dispersion of observed and unobserved prices.  College educated workers are
the only group to experience a shrinking gender gap in unobserved characteristics after 1983, which
actually made a sizeable contribution to the large reduction in the total earnings gap.  Yet the main
contributor to the post-1983 recovery in relative earnings for college educated women is declining
gender differences in observed experience and job characteristics.
Why did the gender gap in unobserved characteristics widen across periods for most
education groups? As depicted in Figure 1, one explanation is a growing differential between men
and women in unmeasured skills.  For example, women who were in the labor force at the beginning
of the period may have interrupted their careers for home activities.  If women chose to spend an
increasing amount of time in home production and a decreasing amount of time in the work force
during the period of analysis, then the gender gap in human capital investment may have widened.
The analysis may have picked up this growing difference in labor force commitment as an expanding
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gap in unobserved characteristics.  However, I include for each worker the number of years of actual
occupation-specific experience and establishment-specific experience.  This should control for most
of the effects of intermittency.  
Even if the measures of actual experience do not pick up all the effects of intermittency, the
available evidence suggests that women are increasing, not decreasing, their attachment to the labor
force.   Table 7 presents several indicators of Korean women's labor force commitment.  The table13
shows that Korean women are waiting longer to get married:  the mean age at marriage for women
rose from 23.3 in 1970 to 25.5 in 1990, and the male-female difference in mean age at marriage
dropped from 3.8 to 3.1 years.  Also during this period, the share of women in the 20-24 age group
who were never married rose from 57.2 percent to 80.5 percent, and the share of older women who
were never married also rose.  Moreover,  labor force participation rates are increasing for married
women in the prime age groups for childbearing and child rearing, and the share of female workers
with five or more years of continuous service more than tripled.  Once starting a family, women are
having fewer children: the total fertility rate fell by more than half, from 4.3 births per woman in
1970 to 1.8 in 1992.  Additional evidence indicates that a growing proportion of women are
reporting "utilization of ability" and "practical experience" as the primary reasons for their
employment, and the number of children accommodated by child care centers is growing rapidly
(Republic of Korea, 1993, Roh et al., 1994).  This evidence does not support the hypothesis of
diminishing female attachment to the labor force and suggests that we must consider other
explanations for the adverse changes in unobserved characteristics.
Widening gender differences in unmeasured abilities of new entrants to the labor force may
explain the growing gap in unobserved characteristics.  One could argue that, given a distribution
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of innate ability across females, most women employed in the beginning period came from the upper
end of the ability distribution.  Then as lower-skilled women entered the workforce, their earnings
dragged down the average for all women.  Because I cannot control for this change in innate ability
of new entrants, the decomposition would attribute this decline in women’s relative earnings to a
growing gender gap in unobserved characteristics.  This explanation seems plausible given the large
increase in female employment during the period of analysis, but without data on employment rates
by education groups for the entire period it is difficult to test this hypothesis.  Hence, we must
consider growing gender differences in unmeasured ability among new labor market entrants as a
possible source of the widening gap in unobserved characteristics.  Of course, outright wage
discrimination by gender remains as an alternative explanation. 
Concluding Remarks
This study has shown that despite rapid economic growth, Korea's gender earnings
differential across education groups actually grew more severe during the 1970s and early 1980s.
It was not until after 1983 that women with high school educations or below made any progress in
closing the gender earnings gap.  The widening earnings differentials before 1983 for women in this
category resulted primarily from a growing gender gap in unobserved characteristics.  This
expanding residual gap may reflect increasing gender differences in the unmeasured skills of new
labor market entrants, and it may also reflect increasing wage discrimination by gender.  After 1983,
women with high school or below benefitted from strong relative improvements in education and
experience.  These women were also helped by a dramatic narrowing in the economy's distribution
of market payoffs to skills, enough to begin to catch up with men in their relative earnings.  College
18
educated women stand apart for not experiencing much of an impact from changes in the returns to
skills.  For women in this category, most of the growing earnings gaps before 1983 and shrinking
gaps thereafter can be explained by changes in observed characteristics, particularly gender
differences in sectors of employment and in occupations.
Hence, a compression in the returns to skills helped only some groups in some periods,
suggesting that policy makers cannot look to economy-wide declines in income inequality as the
primary means for improving the relative position of women.  Furthermore, women continued to face
adverse changes in unobserved characteristics throughout the entire period.  If this growing residual
gap is indeed a result of increased wage discrimination, the government may need to take more direct
action.  Regarding discrimination, Alice Amsden (1990: 85) writes: "Not only has Korea set world
records with its growth rate in wages, it has also outcompeted other countries in its discrimination
against women workers."  Korea's Gender-Equal Employment Act of 1987 stipulates that employers
can be imprisoned for up to two years if they pay different wages for the same jobs, but few if any
employers have actually gone to jail.   Stricter enforcement of Korea's equal pay for equal work14
provision would help to reduce outright wage discrimination.  
However, the gender earnings ratio will not budge much further if women remain
concentrated in low-wage occupations with few post-employment training opportunities. The
maximum penalty imposed on firms who blatantly employ, train, and promote mostly men is less
than $3500.  Stricter penalties for violating Korea's equal opportunity provisions could go a long way
in reducing the obstacles that keep women in the lower ranks of the male earnings distribution.
More generally, by boosting Korean women's labor force potential, stronger enforcement of Korea's
equal opportunity provisions would enhance the productivity of the entire economy.
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Figure 1. Framework for Determinants of Earnings Differential Trends
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Figure 2. Effect of Narrowing Male Residual Earnings Dispersion on Gender Earnings Gap
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Table 1.  Female-Male Earnings Ratios, 1971-1992  (In Percent)a
Year
All
Levels
Primary
and Below
Middle
School
High
School
College 
and Above
Unadjusted Earnings Ratios
1971 46.6 54.3 53.3 64.5 77.4
1976 49.5 59.3 59.0 60.0 67.2
1980 46.7 53.3 53.0 56.5 61.2
1983 47.3 51.8 51.9 55.7 66.1
1986 48.8 52.3 52.0 56.0 65.5
1989 54.5 55.1 56.2 60.2 66.5
1992 57.3 59.5 56.7 60.7 69.6
Adjusted Earnings Ratiosb
1971 46.2 53.0 53.1 64.8 77.7
1976 49.4 59.0 59.7 59.9 66.6
1980 45.7 50.7 52.6 57.0 61.2
1983 46.0 48.8 51.0 56.1 66.0
1986 48.2 50.1 51.7 56.7 65.6
1989 53.9 53.4 56.0 61.0 66.6
1992 57.6 59.1 58.4 62.3 69.9
Ratio of the geometric means of female and male monthly earnings.a 
 Adjusted for hours worked by evaluating the earnings regression for each gender-education group at theb
male means for the time variables and at own-group means for remaining variables.
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Table 2.  Korea’s Non-Agricultural Employment Structure by Gender (In Percent)
Total Workers Male Workers Female Workers Percent Female
Year 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992
Employment Structure by Manufacturing Sector
 Food, Beverages,
  and Tobacco 9.1 7.3 10.4 7.3 7.4 7.1 36.6 35.2
 Textiles and Apparel 36.7 21.6 21.0 13.4 56.0 36.1 68.3 60.2
 Wood and Paper 10.1 6.3 14.2 7.5 4.9 4.2 21.8 24.2
 Chemical 12.6 12.2 15.6 13.4 8.8 10.2 31.3 30.0
 Metal and Mineral 13.1 14.6 20.8 18.3 3.6 8.1 12.4 20.1
 Electrical and
  Electronic 7.3 20.4 7.7 18.3 6.9 24.2 42.2 42.8
 Other Machinery and
  Equipment 11.1 17.6 10.2 21.8 12.2 10.0 49.1 20.5
 All Manufacturing 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 44.7 36.0
Employment Structure by Occupation
 Professional and
  Technical 5.8 14.3 7.6 15.6 2.4 11.8 15.4 28.2
 Administrative and
  Managerial 1.1 3.7 1.6 5.5 0.1 0.1 2.4 1.1
 Clerical 17.0 26.3 18.2 26.8 14.9 25.4 31.8 33.0
 Sales 0.8 2.3 0.9 1.8 0.6 3.2 26.8 47.8
 Service 4.9 6.1 5.1 5.6 4.5 7.2 33.5 40.0
 Production, Transpor-
  tation, and Laborers 70.5 47.3 66.6 44.7 77.5 52.4 39.8 37.9
 All Occupations 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 36.2 34.2
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Table 3.  Female Position in the Male Residual Earnings Distribution (In Percent)
Year 1971 1976 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992
Female Ranking Female Position in Male Residual Earnings
All Education Groups
Mean 38.4 34.5 24.5 28.7 29.1 27.2 23.5
10th 6.3 8.6 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.1 2.7
50th 39.5 34.9 24.7 29.2 30.9 28.1 23.5
90th 80.8 71.8 63.4 71.2 70.7 68.2 67.3
Primary and Below
Mean 44.7 38.1 25.9 24.3 20.9 18.6 10.7
10th 7.1 5.6 3.7 2.6 1.9 2.0 1.0
50th 46.4 42.0 26.9 24.8 21.1 18.8 10.3
90th 86.5 80.1 67.0 68.8 65.0 59.2 47.3
Middle School
Mean 43.6 39.3 30.4 35.5 34.8 29.4 16.7
10th 8.9 10.9 7.1 7.6 5.9 3.8 1.5
50th 45.2 39.4 30.7 36.6 37.8 31.4 16.6
90th 82.5 75.2 66.5 73.9 73.5 71.5 59.1
High School
Mean 39.2 31.9 22.3 26.7 24.5 24.3 20.5
10th 6.7 7.2 4.0 4.3 4.2 4.5 2.9
50th 39.3 31.9 21.8 26.3 24.7 23.7 19.8
90th 84.1 71.2 59.4 67.8 63.5 62.2 59.8
College and Above
Mean 41.5 45.6 44.5 56.9 56.5 54.8 55.2
10th 7.4 15.7 6.6 11.3 7.9 9.7 9.9
50th 43.8 46.3 45.1 61.5 62.9 59.7 57.2
90th 82.2 74.5 89.6 93.1 93.8 92.0 92.7
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Table 4.  Log Residual Earnings Dispersion for Males, 1971-1992
Year 1971 1976 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992
Spreada Difference in Residual Log Earnings
90-10 1.031 0.923 0.824 0.744 0.676 0.664 0.602
90-50 0.488 0.451 0.409 0.355 0.334 0.325 0.304
50-10 0.543 0.472 0.415 0.389 0.342 0.339 0.298
75-25 0.532 0.481 0.425 0.384 0.341 0.339 0.305
75-50 0.257 0.233 0.213 0.186 0.170 0.168 0.154
50-25 0.275 0.248 0.212 0.197 0.171 0.171 0.151
 Difference in conditional quantile of log earnings.a
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Table 5.  Cross-Sectional Decomposition of Earnings Gaps by Education Groups (In Log Points)
Year 1971 1976 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992
All Levels
Total Earnings Gap 0.765 0.702 0.761 0.750 0.717 0.607 0.557
  Explaineda 0.641 0.541 0.530 0.577 0.563 0.438 0.372
    Edu/Exp 0.484 0.419 0.372 0.384 0.370 0.303 0.259
    Occ/Ind 0.172 0.128 0.170 0.203 0.194 0.134 0.111
  Residual 0.124 0.161 0.231 0.173 0.153 0.169 0.185
% Explained 83.8 77.0 69.7 77.0 78.6 72.2 66.8
Primary and Below
Total Earnings Gap 0.610 0.523 0.629 0.657 0.648 0.596 0.519
  Explaineda 0.554 0.414 0.405 0.432 0.414 0.335 0.211
    Exp 0.413 0.287 0.215 0.198 0.148 0.118 0.084
    Occ/Ind 0.192 0.147 0.225 0.275 0.297 0.243 0.133
  Residual 0.056 0.109 0.224 0.225 0.234 0.261 0.308
% Explained 90.9 79.1 64.3 65.7 63.9 56.2 40.6
Middle School
Total Earnings Gap 0.630 0.527 0.635 0.657 0.655 0.576 0.568
  Explaineda 0.565 0.432 0.466 0.542 0.548 0.432 0.334
    Exp 0.430 0.332 0.307 0.339 0.315 0.255 0.185
    Occ/Ind 0.156 0.096 0.167 0.216 0.233 0.175 0.137
  Residual 0.065 0.096 0.169 0.115 0.106 0.144 0.233
% Explained 89.7 81.9 73.3 82.6 83.8 75.0 58.9
High School
Total Earnings Gap 0.439 0.510 0.570 0.585 0.579 0.507 0.499
  Explaineda 0.329 0.318 0.324 0.403 0.395 0.321 0.302
    Exp 0.299 0.251 0.253 0.284 0.269 0.214 0.197
    Occ/Ind 0.041 0.062 0.064 0.121 0.123 0.092 0.087
  Residual 0.110 0.192 0.246 0.183 0.184 0.186 0.197
% Explained 75.0 62.3 56.9 68.8 68.2 63.3 60.5
College and Above
Total Earnings Gap 0.256 0.397 0.490 0.415 0.423 0.409 0.362
  Explaineda 0.169 0.346 0.448 0.466 0.468 0.442 0.395
    Edu/Exp 0.165 0.226 0.276 0.305 0.333 0.311 0.265
    Occ/Ind 0.015 0.119 0.168 0.157 0.131 0.124 0.127
  Residual 0.088 0.051 0.043 -0.052 -0.045 -0.033 -0.032
% Explained 65.8 87.1 91.3 112.4 110.5 108.1 108.9
The time and location variables account for the difference between the explained gap and its componenta 
parts.
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Table 6.  Rates of Change in Gender Earnings Gaps by Educational Attainment  (In Percent)a
Period 1971-1983 1983-1992 1971-1992
All Levels
Total Change -0.046 -2.774 -0.857
(0.256) (0.506) (0.309)
  Observed Characteristics 0.652 -0.768 0.230
(0.284) (0.562) (0.210)
    Edu/Exp 0.440 -0.560 0.142
(0.135) (0.267) (0.125)
    Occ/Ind 0.185 -0.345 0.027
(0.167) (0.330) (0.105)
  Observed Prices -1.037 -1.930 -1.302
(0.148) (0.292) (0.121)
    Edu/Exp -1.253 -1.032 -1.187
(0.080) (0.159) (0.049)
    Occ/Ind 0.182 -0.885 -0.135
(0.098) (0.194) (0.120)
  Unobserved Characteristics 0.691 0.439 0.616
(0.311) (0.614) (0.170)
  Unobserved Prices -0.352 -0.515 -0.400
(0.089) (0.175) (0.051)
Primary and Below
Total Change 0.662 -1.858 -0.088
(0.412) (0.815) (0.339)
  Observed Characteristics -0.034 -1.937 -0.600
(0.232) (0.458) (0.230)
    Exp -0.242 -1.345 -0.570
(0.084) (0.166) (0.120)
    Occ/Ind 0.296 -0.975 -0.082
(0.260) (0.513) (0.190)
  Observed Prices -0.649 -0.612 -0.638
(0.265) (0.524) (0.143)
    Exp -1.516 0.477 -0.923
(0.174) (0.344) (0.222)
    Occ/Ind 0.747 -1.073 0.206
(0.148) (0.293) (0.201)
  Unobserved Characteristics 1.467 1.896 1.594
(0.264) (0.521) (0.149)
  Unobserved Prices -0.121 -1.206 -0.444
(0.134) (0.264) (0.131)
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Table 6.  continued  (In Percent)
Period 1971-1983 1983-1992 1971-1992
Middle School
Total Change 0.459 -1.287 -0.061
(0.452) (0.894) (0.302)
  Observed Characteristics 0.982 -1.130 0.354
(0.496) (0.979) (0.343)
    Exp 0.700 -1.163 0.146
(0.313) (0.619) (0.253)
    Occ/Ind 0.290 -0.290 0.117
(0.257) (0.509) (0.151)
  Observed Prices -0.785 -1.453 -0.983
(0.230) (0.455) (0.142)
    Exp -1.316 -0.516 -1.078
(0.157) (0.310) (0.117)
    Occ/Ind 0.461 -0.851 0.071
(0.147) (0.290) (0.155)
  Unobserved Characteristics 0.383 2.169 0.914
(0.364) (0.718) (0.267)
  Unobserved Prices -0.122 -0.874 -0.345
(0.066) (0.131) (0.084)
High School
Total Change 1.099 -1.741 0.255
(0.188) (0.371) (0.305)
  Observed Characteristics 0.703 0.231 0.563
(0.258) (0.510) (0.148)
    Exp 0.304 0.254 0.289
(0.158) (0.311) (0.085)
    Occ/Ind 0.376 -0.005 0.263
(0.127) (0.252) (0.079)
  Observed Prices -0.114 -1.575 -0.548
(0.164) (0.324) (0.172)
    Exp -0.401 -1.295 -0.667
(0.127) (0.251) (0.113)
    Occ/Ind 0.238 -0.497 0.019
(0.083) (0.165) (0.087)
  Unobserved Characteristics 0.908 0.223 0.705
(0.301) (0.594) (0.177)
  Unobserved Prices -0.398 -0.621 -0.464
(0.151) (0.298) (0.085)
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Table 6.  continued  (In Percent)
Period 1971-1983 1983-1992 1971-1992
College and Above
Total Change 1.255 -1.695 0.378
(0.494) (0.976) (0.400)
  Observed Characteristics 1.194 -0.845 0.588
(0.171) (0.339) (0.226)
    Exp 0.133 -0.345 -0.009
(0.063) (0.125) (0.059)
    Occ/Ind 0.958 -0.458 0.537
(0.149) (0.295) (0.164)
  Observed Prices 0.222 -0.140 0.114
(0.282) (0.557) (0.157)
    Exp 0.283 -0.114 0.165
(0.256) (0.505) (0.144)
    Occ/Ind -0.061 -0.026 -0.051
(0.250) (0.494) (0.135)
  Unobserved Characteristics 0.113 -0.584 -0.095
(0.306) (0.604) (0.180)
  Unobserved Prices -0.273 -0.126 -0.230
(0.168) (0.332) (0.092)
 Figures represent average annual rates of change and are calculated using a linear spline with a break pointa
in 1986.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  A negative sign indicates that the gap has become smaller, and
a positive sign indicates that the gap has grown larger.
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Table 7.  Indicators of Korean Women's Labor Force Comitment
1970 1990
Mean Age at First Marriage
   Women 23.3 25.5
   Men 27.1 28.6
   Male-Female Difference 3.8 3.1
Share of Women Never Married
   Ages 20-24 57.2 80.5
   Ages 25-49 2.8 8.0
Labor Force Participation Ratesa
   Married Women (All Age Groups) 33.9 41.3
   Married Women (20-24) 17.4 27.6
   Married Women (25-29) 22.3 27.5
   Married Women (30-34) 32.2 36.8
   Married Women (35-39) 41.1 47.7
Share of Female Workers With Five or More
   Years of Continuous Serviceb 6.5 22.0
Total Fertility Rate (Births/Woman)c 4.3 1.8
Sources: Republic of Korea (1993); Roh, Kim, and Mun (1994), and World Bank (1994).
Figures are for 1983 and 1992.a 
Figures are for 1980 and 1992.b 
Figures are for 1970 and 1992.c 
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Appendix Table 1.  Earnings Regression Variable Means — Male
Year 1971 1976 1980 1983
Dependent Variable
  Log Monthly Earnings 10.105 (0.639) 11.229 (0.618) 12.003 (0.534) 12.466 (0.499)
Time Input Variables
  Log Hours/Month 5.356 (0.196) 5.472 (0.231) 5.426 (0.186) 5.445 (0.193)
  Part-Time 0.048 (0.214) 0.012 (0.107) 0.022 (0.147) 0.020 (0.139)
Education and Experience Variables
  Primary School and Below* 0.270 (0.444) 0.195 (0.397) 0.150 (0.357) 0.108 (0.310)
  Middle School 0.305 (0.460) 0.307 (0.461) 0.311 (0.463) 0.303 (0.460)
  High School 0.280 (0.449) 0.321 (0.467) 0.360 (0.480) 0.392 (0.488)
  Junior College — — 0.027 (0.161) 0.032 (0.176) 0.039 (0.193)
  College or Higher 0.145 (0.352) 0.150 (0.357) 0.147 (0.354) 0.159 (0.365)
  Experience (age-education-6) 15.849 (8.744) 15.312 (9.187) 15.076 (9.360) 15.611 (9.184)
  Experience Squared/100 3.277 (3.461) 3.188 (3.587) 3.149 (3.682) 3.280 (3.644)
  Establishment-Specific Tenure 2.840 (3.172) 2.951 (3.678) 3.062 (3.784) 4.275 (4.219)
  Tenure Squared/100 0.181 (0.660) 0.222 (0.594) 0.237 (0.607) 0.361 (0.729)
  Years in Occupation < 5 years* 0.647 (0.478) 0.678 (0.467) 0.660 (0.474) 0.478 (0.500)
  Years in Occupation 5-9 years 0.236 (0.425) 0.213 (0.409) 0.213 (0.410) 0.308 (0.462)
  Years in Occupation > 9 years 0.116 (0.321) 0.109 (0.312) 0.126 (0.332) 0.214 (0.410)
Occupation and Industry Variables
  Percent Female 0.161 (0.225) 0.224 (0.238) 0.217 (0.246) 0.175 (0.231)
  Supervisor 0.060 (0.237) 0.114 (0.318) 0.088 (0.283) 0.147 (0.354)
  Small Firm  * 0.304 (0.460) 0.286 (0.452) 0.224 (0.417) 0.124 (0.330)
  Medium Firm 0.437 (0.496) 0.349 (0.477) 0.376 (0.484) 0.422 (0.494)
  Large Firm 0.259 (0.438) 0.365 (0.481) 0.400 (0.490) 0.454 (0.498)
  Mining 0.074 (0.262) 0.067 (0.250) 0.041 (0.198) 0.046 (0.211)
  Light Manufacturing 1 0.061 (0.238) 0.048 (0.215) 0.047 (0.212) 0.051 (0.221)
  Light Manufacturing 2* 0.123 (0.328) 0.126 (0.332) 0.121 (0.326) 0.114 (0.318)
  Heavy Manufacturing 1 0.219 (0.413) 0.206 (0.404) 0.195 (0.396) 0.191 (0.393)
  Heavy Manufacturing 2 0.181 (0.385) 0.241 (0.428) 0.299 (0.458) 0.298 (0.457)
  Utilities/Construction 0.046 (0.209) 0.038 (0.192) 0.053 (0.224) 0.055 (0.228)
  Commerce 0.023 (0.150) 0.029 (0.169) 0.034 (0.181) 0.033 (0.178)
  Transport/Storage/Communication 0.170 (0.376) 0.103 (0.304) 0.102 (0.303) 0.104 (0.305)
  Business Services 0.043 (0.202) 0.061 (0.239) 0.049 (0.215) 0.052 (0.222)
  Social Services 0.062 (0.241) 0.080 (0.271) 0.060 (0.237) 0.055 (0.229)
Location Variables
  Seoul* 0.354 (0.478) 0.330 (0.470) 0.306 (0.461) 0.313 (0.464)
  Pusan 0.155 (0.361) 0.161 (0.367) 0.150 (0.357) 0.125 (0.331)
  Kyunggi 0.115 (0.319) 0.143 (0.350) 0.184 (0.387) 0.195 (0.396)
  Kangwon, Choongchung, and Julla 0.217 (0.412) 0.190 (0.393) 0.149 (0.356) 0.150 (0.357)
  Kyungsang 0.159 (0.366) 0.175 (0.380) 0.212 (0.409) 0.218 (0.413)
Number of Observations 120,899 18,326 238,190 356,927
 Excluded dummy variable in full-sample regressions.  Standard deviations in parentheses*
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Appendix Table 1.  (continued)
Year 1986 1989 1992
Dependent Variable
  Log Monthly Earnings 12.705 (0.466) 13.111 (0.428) 13.535 (0.386)
Time Input Variables
  Log Hours/Month 5.415 (0.186) 5.386 (0.172) 5.360 (0.172)
  Part-Time 0.018 (0.133) 0.029 (0.168) 0.014 (0.117)
Education and Experience Variables
  Primary School and Below* 0.076 (0.265) 0.056 (0.230) 0.043 (0.202)
  Middle School 0.258 (0.437) 0.215 (0.411) 0.154 (0.361)
  High School 0.440 (0.496) 0.474 (0.499) 0.457 (0.498)
  Junior College 0.047 (0.211) 0.060 (0.238) 0.077 (0.267)
  College or Higher 0.180 (0.384) 0.194 (0.396) 0.269 (0.444)
  Experience (age-education-6) 15.838 (9.142) 15.933 (9.367) 16.417 (10.183)
  Experience Squared/100 3.344 (3.638) 3.416 (3.762) 3.732 (4.299)
  Establishment-Specific Tenure 5.124 (4.693) 5.429 (5.046) 6.046 (5.723)
  Tenure Squared/100 0.483 (0.871) 0.549 (0.964) 0.693 (1.346)
  Years in Occupation < 5 years* 0.415 (0.493) 0.423 (0.494) 0.415 (0.493)
  Years in Occupation 5-9 years 0.328 (0.470) 0.282 (0.450) 0.254 (0.435)
  Years in Occupation > 9 years 0.257 (0.437) 0.295 (0.456) 0.332 (0.471)
Occupation and Industry Variables
  Percent Female 0.173 (0.234) 0.192 (0.243) 0.198 (0.224)
  Supervisor 0.151 (0.358) 0.159 (0.366) 0.166 (0.372)
  Small Firm * 0.096 (0.294) 0.120 (0.325) 0.143 (0.350)
  Medium Firm 0.504 (0.500) 0.466 (0.499) 0.518 (0.500)
  Large Firm 0.400 (0.490) 0.414 (0.493) 0.339 (0.473)
  Mining 0.047 (0.211) 0.033 (0.180) 0.010 (0.100)
  Light Manufacturing 1 0.049 (0.215) 0.049 (0.215) 0.046 (0.210)
  Light Manufacturing 2* 0.109 (0.311) 0.109 (0.312) 0.085 (0.279)
  Heavy Manufacturing 1 0.171 (0.376) 0.157 (0.364) 0.164 (0.370)
  Heavy Manufacturing 2 0.302 (0.459) 0.326 (0.469) 0.335 (0.472)
  Utilities/Construction 0.053 (0.224) 0.034 (0.182) 0.043 (0.203)
  Commerce 0.038 (0.191) 0.040 (0.195) 0.048 (0.213)
  Transport/Storage/Communication 0.112 (0.316) 0.116 (0.321) 0.057 (0.231)
  Business Services 0.058 (0.233) 0.073 (0.260) 0.104 (0.305)
  Social Services 0.062 (0.242) 0.063 (0.243) 0.108 (0.310)
Location Variables
  Seoul* 0.297 (0.457) 0.283 (0.451) 0.331 (0.471)
  Pusan 0.097 (0.296) 0.098 (0.297) 0.071 (0.257)
  Kyunggi 0.195 (0.396) 0.223 (0.416) 0.242 (0.428)
  Kangwon, Choongchung, and Julla 0.154 (0.361) 0.158 (0.365) 0.153 (0.360)
  Kyungsang 0.257 (0.437) 0.238 (0.426) 0.203 (0.402)
Number of Observations 366,690 19,219 26,873
 Excluded dummy variable in full-sample regressions.  Standard deviations in parentheses*
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Appendix Table 2.  Earnings Regression Variable Means — Female
Year 1971 1976 1980 1983
Dependent Variable
  Log Monthly Earnings 9.341 (0.502) 10.526 (0.390) 11.242 (0.343) 11.716 (0.354)
Time Input Variables
  Log Hours/Month 5.375 (0.182) 5.487 (0.228) 5.464 (0.181) 5.488 (0.179)
  Part-Time 0.030 (0.171) 0.010 (0.098) 0.017 (0.130) 0.009 (0.096)
Education and Experience Variables
  Primary School and Below* 0.511 (0.500) 0.395 (0.489) 0.319 (0.466) 0.191 (0.393)
  Middle School 0.347 (0.476) 0.398 (0.490) 0.452 (0.498) 0.492 (0.500)
  High School 0.122 (0.327) 0.180 (0.384) 0.203 (0.402) 0.286 (0.452)
  Junior College — — 0.010 (0.099) 0.011 (0.106) 0.015 (0.122)
  College or Higher 0.020 (0.141) 0.016 (0.126) 0.015 (0.122) 0.016 (0.127)
  Experience (age-education-6) 7.764 (5.252) 7.739 (6.485) 7.770 (7.298) 7.835 (7.946)
  Experience Squared/100 0.879 (1.673) 1.019 (2.163) 1.136 (2.572) 1.245 (2.814)
  Establishment-Specific Tenure 1.496 (1.704) 1.510 (1.905) 1.584 (1.908) 2.137 (2.214)
  Tenure Squared/100 0.051 (0.157) 0.059 (0.240) 0.062 (0.215) 0.095 (0.251)
  Years in Occupation < 5 years* 0.920 (0.272) 0.907 (0.290) 0.906 (0.293) 0.830 (0.376)
  Years in Occupation 5 - 9 years 0.072 (0.258) 0.082 (0.275) 0.086 (0.280) 0.151 (0.358)
  Years in Occupation > 9 years 0.008 (0.091) 0.010 (0.102) 0.009 (0.093) 0.020 (0.139)
Occupation and Industry Variables
  Percent Female 0.715 (0.261) 0.652 (0.247) 0.688 (0.244) 0.726 (0.259)
  Supervisor 0.004 (0.060) 0.005 (0.073) 0.001 (0.037) 0.015 (0.123)
  Small Firm * 0.213 (0.410) 0.169 (0.375) 0.152 (0.359) 0.084 (0.277)
  Medium Firm 0.459 (0.498) 0.342 (0.474) 0.410 (0.492) 0.468 (0.499)
  Large Firm 0.328 (0.469) 0.489 (0.500) 0.439 (0.496) 0.448 (0.497)
  Mining 0.005 (0.067) 0.004 (0.066) 0.003 (0.053) 0.003 (0.059)
  Light Manufacturing 1 0.062 (0.240) 0.051 (0.220) 0.048 (0.215) 0.048 (0.213)
  Light Manufacturing 2* 0.464 (0.499) 0.437 (0.496) 0.447 (0.497) 0.421 (0.494)
  Heavy Manufacturing 1 0.130 (0.336) 0.165 (0.371) 0.142 (0.349) 0.142 (0.349)
  Heavy Manufacturing 2 0.173 (0.378) 0.212 (0.408) 0.218 (0.413) 0.223 (0.416)
  Utilities/Construction 0.004 (0.067) 0.005 (0.069) 0.006 (0.077) 0.008 (0.087)
  Commerce 0.023 (0.150) 0.022 (0.148) 0.025 (0.156) 0.029 (0.167)
  Transport/Storage/Communication 0.076 (0.265) 0.025 (0.157) 0.042 (0.200) 0.051 (0.220)
  Business Services 0.023 (0.151) 0.040 (0.195) 0.029 (0.167) 0.031 (0.174)
  Social Services 0.040 (0.197) 0.039 (0.194) 0.040 (0.196) 0.045 (0.207)
Location Variables
  Seoul* 0.417 (0.493) 0.344 (0.475) 0.289 (0.453) 0.301 (0.459)
  Pusan 0.173 (0.378) 0.196 (0.397) 0.189 (0.391) 0.179 (0.384)
  Kyunggi 0.112 (0.316) 0.156 (0.363) 0.191 (0.393) 0.199 (0.399)
  Kangwon, Choongchung, and Julla 0.150 (0.357) 0.135 (0.342) 0.125 (0.331) 0.128 (0.334)
  Kyungsang 0.147 (0.355) 0.168 (0.374) 0.206 (0.404) 0.194 (0.395)
Number of Observations 68,721 11,817 165,772 227,732
 Excluded dummy variable in full-sample regressions.  Standard deviations in parentheses.*
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Appendix Table 2.  (continued)
Year 1986 1989 1992
Dependent Variable
  Log Monthly Earnings 11.989 (0.337) 12.504 (0.310) 12.978 (0.318)
Time Input Variables
  Log Hours/Month 5.439 (0.164) 5.403 (0.138) 5.350 (0.147)
  Part-Time 0.007 (0.085) 0.005 (0.073) 0.013 (0.113)
Education and Experience Variables
  Primary School and Below* 0.112 (0.316) 0.101 (0.302) 0.120 (0.325)
  Middle School 0.435 (0.496) 0.330 (0.470) 0.216 (0.411)
  High School 0.405 (0.491) 0.504 (0.500) 0.533 (0.499)
  Junior College 0.025 (0.155) 0.038 (0.191) 0.078 (0.268)
  College or Higher 0.022 (0.147) 0.027 (0.162) 0.054 (0.226)
  Experience (age-education-6) 8.071 (8.610) 9.458 (10.255) 11.988 (12.324)
  Experience Squared/100 1.393 (3.077) 1.946 (3.776) 2.956 (4.952)
  Establishment-Specific Tenure 2.449 (2.562) 2.675 (2.761) 3.141 (3.447)
  Tenure Squared/100 0.126 (0.347) 0.148 (0.397) 0.217 (0.560)
  Years in Occupation < 5 years* 0.800 (0.400) 0.768 (0.422) 0.714 (0.452)
  Years in Occupation 5 - 9 years 0.168 (0.374) 0.183 (0.387) 0.204 (0.403)
  Years in Occupation > 9 years 0.031 (0.175) 0.049 (0.216) 0.082 (0.275)
Occupation and Industry Variables
  Percent Female 0.703 (0.251) 0.669 (0.237) 0.619 (0.252)
  Supervisor 0.010 (0.099) 0.013 (0.112) 0.008 (0.088)
  Small Firm * 0.074 (0.263) 0.090 (0.286) 0.155 (0.362)
  Medium Firm 0.510 (0.500) 0.462 (0.499) 0.574 (0.495)
  Large Firm 0.415 (0.493) 0.448 (0.497) 0.271 (0.445)
  Mining 0.004 (0.061) 0.003 (0.058) 0.001 (0.027)
  Light Manufacturing 1 0.045 (0.206) 0.053 (0.224) 0.048 (0.214)
  Light Manufacturing 2* 0.406 (0.491) 0.359 (0.480) 0.246 (0.431)
  Heavy Manufacturing 1 0.126 (0.331) 0.097 (0.296) 0.123 (0.328)
  Heavy Manufacturing 2 0.232 (0.422) 0.304 (0.460) 0.265 (0.441)
  Utilities/Construction 0.009 (0.095) 0.005 (0.074) 0.009 (0.092)
  Commerce 0.033 (0.180) 0.038 (0.192) 0.054 (0.226)
  Transport/Storage/Communication 0.048 (0.213) 0.027 (0.161) 0.019 (0.138)
  Business Services 0.034 (0.180) 0.041 (0.198) 0.074 (0.262)
  Social Services 0.064 (0.246) 0.071 (0.258) 0.161 (0.368)
Location Variables
  Seoul* 0.283 (0.450) 0.256 (0.437) 0.323 (0.468)
  Pusan 0.167 (0.373) 0.170 (0.375) 0.125 (0.330)
  Kyunggi 0.196 (0.397) 0.222 (0.416) 0.225 (0.418)
  Kangwon, Choongchung, and Julla 0.140 (0.347) 0.150 (0.358) 0.143 (0.350)
  Kyungsang 0.214 (0.410) 0.201 (0.401) 0.184 (0.388)
Number of Observations 213,144 11,162 13,988
 Excluded dummy variable in full-sample regressions.  Standard deviations in parentheses.*
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Appendix Table 3.  Log-Earnings Regression Estimates — Male
Year  1971  1976   1980  1983
Time Input Variables
  Log Hours/Month  0.172 *** (0.008)  0.172 *** (0.015)  0.311 *** (0.004)  0.234 *** (0.003)
  Part-time -0.081 *** (0.007)  0.068 ** (0.031) -0.050 *** (0.005) -0.099 *** (0.004)
Education and Experience Variables
  Middle School  0.164 *** (0.003)  0.110 *** (0.009)  0.091 *** (0.002)  0.063 *** (0.002)
  High School  0.429 *** (0.004)  0.374 *** (0.010)  0.288 *** (0.002)  0.223 *** (0.002)
  Junior College — —  0.570 *** (0.020)  0.514 *** (0.004)  0.433 *** (0.003)
  College or Higher  0.922 *** (0.005)  0.977 *** (0.013)  0.820 *** (0.003)  0.750 *** (0.003)
  Experience (age-education-6)  0.056 *** (0.001)  0.045 *** (0.001)  0.044 *** (0.000)  0.043 *** (0.000)
  Experience Squared/100 -0.089 *** (0.001) -0.076 *** (0.003) -0.078 *** (0.001) -0.080 *** (0.001)
  Establishment-Specific Tenure  0.026 *** (0.001)  0.039 *** (0.002)  0.024 *** (0.000)  0.021 *** (0.000)
  Tenure Squared/100 -0.049 *** (0.003) -0.105 *** (0.011) -0.069 *** (0.003) -0.046 *** (0.002)
  Years in Occupation 5-9 yrs  0.120 *** (0.003)  0.081 *** (0.008)  0.116 *** (0.002)  0.113 *** (0.001)
  Years in Occupation > 9 yrs  0.163 *** (0.005)  0.116 *** (0.012)  0.178 *** (0.003)  0.177 *** (0.002)
Occupation and Industry Variables
  Percent Female -0.315 *** (0.006) -0.240 *** (0.015) -0.264 *** (0.003) -0.272 *** (0.003)
  Supervisor  0.167 *** (0.006)  0.215 *** (0.011)  0.278 *** (0.003)  0.154 *** (0.002)
  Medium Firm  0.209 *** (0.003)  0.110 *** (0.008)  0.080 *** (0.002)  0.113 *** (0.002)
  Large Firm  0.308 *** (0.004)  0.197 *** (0.008)  0.109 *** (0.002)  0.167 *** (0.002)
  Mining  0.001 (0.007)  0.165 *** (0.017)  0.228 *** (0.005)  0.251 *** (0.003)
  Light Manufacturing 1 -0.007 (0.006)  0.039 ** (0.016)  0.074 *** (0.004)  0.066 *** (0.003)
  Heavy Manufacturing 1 -0.064 *** (0.005)  0.010 (0.011)  0.028 *** (0.003)  0.046 *** (0.002)
  Heavy Manufacturing 2 -0.109 *** (0.005)  0.023 ** (0.011) -0.014 *** (0.003)  0.014 *** (0.002)
  Utilities/Construction  0.176 *** (0.007)  0.193 *** (0.018)  0.128 *** (0.004)  0.162 *** (0.003)
  Commerce -0.043 *** (0.009)  0.034 * (0.020)  0.091 *** (0.004)  0.080 *** (0.003)
  Transport/Storage/Communic.  0.067 *** (0.005)  0.015 (0.014)  0.114 *** (0.003)  0.183 *** (0.002)
  Business Services  0.292 *** (0.007)  0.235 *** (0.016)  0.167 *** (0.004)  0.171 *** (0.003)
  Social Services  0.059 *** (0.007)  0.030 ** (0.015)  0.112 *** (0.004)  0.182 *** (0.003)
Location Variables
  Pusan -0.132 *** (0.004) -0.027 *** (0.009) -0.092 *** (0.002) -0.077 *** (0.002)
  Kyunggi -0.101 *** (0.004) -0.052 *** (0.010) -0.055 *** (0.002) -0.078 *** (0.002)
  Kangwon,Choongchung,&Julla -0.165 *** (0.004) -0.086 *** (0.010) -0.114 *** (0.002) -0.115 *** (0.002)
  Kyungsang -0.133 *** (0.004)  0.029 *** (0.009) -0.033 *** (0.002) -0.038 *** (0.002)
Constant  8.129 *** (0.043)  9.303 *** (0.085)  9.486 *** (0.024) 10.272 *** (0.018)
Number of Observations  120,899  18,326  238,190  356,927
Adjusted R2  0.570  0.572  0.610  0.620
 Statistically significant at the .10 level;  at the .05 level;  at the .01 level (two tailed tests).* ** ***
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Appendix Table 3.  (continued)
Year  1986  1989  1992
Time Input Variables
  Log Hours/Month  0.180 *** (0.003)  0.378 *** (0.015)  0.212 *** (0.011)
  Part-time -0.024 *** (0.004)  0.066 *** (0.016) -0.052 *** (0.015)
Education and Experience Variables
  Middle School  0.056 *** (0.002)  0.040 *** (0.010) -0.011 (0.009)
  High School  0.193 *** (0.002)  0.143 *** (0.010)  0.084 *** (0.009)
  Junior College  0.361 *** (0.003)  0.279 *** (0.013)  0.183 *** (0.011)
  College or Higher  0.683 *** (0.003)  0.558 *** (0.012)  0.416 *** (0.010)
  Experience (age-education-6)  0.041 *** (0.000)  0.033 *** (0.001)  0.032 *** (0.001)
  Experience Squared/100 -0.077 *** (0.001) -0.068 *** (0.002) -0.063 *** (0.002)
  Establishment-Specific Tenure  0.018 *** (0.000)  0.022 *** (0.001)  0.014 *** (0.001)
  Tenure Squared/100 -0.011 *** (0.001) -0.017 *** (0.006) -0.007 *** (0.003)
  Years in Occupation 5-9 yrs  0.089 *** (0.001)  0.077 *** (0.006)  0.091 *** (0.005)
  Years in Occupation > 9 yrs  0.146 *** (0.002)  0.133 *** (0.008)  0.155 *** (0.006)
Occupation and Industry Variables
  Percent Female -0.264 *** (0.002) -0.228 *** (0.010) -0.192 *** (0.008)
  Supervisor  0.144 *** (0.002)  0.124 *** (0.006)  0.137 *** (0.005)
  Medium Firm  0.084 *** (0.002)  0.133 *** (0.007)  0.018 *** (0.005)
  Large Firm  0.160 *** (0.002)  0.230 *** (0.007)  0.075 *** (0.005)
  Mining  0.196 *** (0.003)  0.122 *** (0.016)  0.041 ** (0.018)
  Light Manufacturing 1  0.046 *** (0.003)  0.020 * (0.011)  0.027 *** (0.009)
  Heavy Manufacturing 1  0.059 *** (0.002)  0.073 *** (0.008)  0.030 *** (0.007)
  Heavy Manufacturing 2  0.049 *** (0.002)  0.055 *** (0.008)  0.009 (0.006)
  Utilities/Construction  0.163 *** (0.003)  0.100 *** (0.013)  0.122 *** (0.010)
  Commerce  0.115 *** (0.003)  0.059 *** (0.012)  0.033 *** (0.009)
  Transport/Storage/Communic.  0.167 *** (0.002)  0.033 *** (0.009)  0.044 *** (0.009)
  Business Services  0.186 *** (0.003)  0.022 ** (0.010)  0.057 *** (0.008)
  Social Services  0.241 *** (0.003)  0.193 *** (0.011)  0.097 *** (0.008)
Location Variables
  Pusan -0.078 *** (0.002) -0.095 *** (0.008) -0.005 (0.007)
  Kyunggi -0.057 *** (0.001) -0.053 *** (0.006)  0.002 (0.005)
  Kangwon,Choongchung,&Julla -0.095 *** (0.002) -0.090 *** (0.007) -0.024 *** (0.005)
  Kyungsang -0.024 *** (0.001)  0.026 *** (0.006)  0.016 *** (0.005)
Constant 10.812 *** (0.017)  10.237 *** (0.081)  11.733 *** (0.059)
Number of Observations  366,690  19,219  26,873
Adjusted R2  0.640  0.578  0.559
 Statistically significant at the .10 level;  at the .05 level;  at the .01 level (two tailed tests).* ** ***
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Appendix Table 4.  Log-Earnings Regression Estimates — Female
Year  1971  1976  1980  1983
Time Input Variables
  Log Hours/Month  0.286 *** (0.009)  0.274 *** (0.013)  0.587 *** (0.004)  0.586 *** (0.003)
  Part-time -0.138 *** (0.009)  0.118 *** (0.029) -0.048 *** (0.005) -0.094 *** (0.006)
Education and Experience Variables
  Middle School  0.146 *** (0.004)  0.079 *** (0.007)  0.064 *** (0.002)  0.053 *** (0.002)
  High School  0.580 *** (0.006)  0.370 *** (0.010)  0.283 *** (0.002)  0.229 *** (0.002)
  Junior College — —  0.845 *** (0.029)  0.736 *** (0.006)  0.643 *** (0.005)
  College or Higher  1.197 *** (0.012)  1.210 *** (0.025)  0.945 *** (0.006)  0.941 *** (0.005)
  Experience (age-education-6)  0.053 *** (0.001)  0.031 *** (0.002)  0.022 *** (0.000)  0.023 *** (0.000)
  Experience Squared/100 -0.130 *** (0.003) -0.090 *** (0.004) -0.056 *** (0.001) -0.058 *** (0.001)
  Establishment-Specific Tenure  0.103 *** (0.002)  0.062 *** (0.002)  0.046 *** (0.001)  0.038 *** (0.000)
  Tenure Squared/100 -0.567 *** (0.018) -0.137 *** (0.017) -0.123 *** (0.005) -0.058 *** (0.004)
  Years in Occupation 5-9 yrs  0.038 *** (0.006)  0.078 *** (0.011)  0.064 *** (0.002)  0.052 *** (0.002)
  Years in Occupation > 9 yrs  0.232 *** (0.020)  0.192 *** (0.030)  0.221 *** (0.008)  0.122 *** (0.005)
Occupation and Industry Variables
  Percent Female  0.102 *** (0.006) -0.034 ** (0.013) -0.054 *** (0.003) -0.064 *** (0.002)
  Supervisor  0.185 *** (0.024)  0.094 *** (0.036)  0.501 *** (0.016)  0.133 *** (0.004)
  Medium Firm  0.089 *** (0.004)  0.040 *** (0.008) -0.002 (0.002)  0.043 *** (0.002)
  Large Firm  0.197 *** (0.004)  0.070 *** (0.008)  0.030 *** (0.002)  0.069 *** (0.002)
  Mining  0.160 *** (0.021)  0.070 * (0.041)  0.122 *** (0.011)  0.167 *** (0.009)
  Light Manufacturing 1 -0.072 *** (0.006) -0.072 *** (0.013) -0.018 *** (0.003)  0.030 *** (0.003)
  Heavy Manufacturing 1  0.004 (0.005)  0.066 *** (0.009)  0.033 *** (0.002)  0.021 *** (0.002)
  Heavy Manufacturing 2  0.093 *** (0.004) -0.080 *** (0.008) -0.065 *** (0.002) -0.026 *** (0.001)
  Utilities/Construction  0.303 *** (0.021)  0.139 *** (0.039)  0.121 *** (0.008)  0.180 *** (0.006)
  Commerce -0.004 (0.010) -0.036 * (0.019)  0.112 *** (0.004)  0.186 *** (0.003)
  Transport/Storage/Communic.  0.192 *** (0.006)  0.140 *** (0.017)  0.337 *** (0.003)  0.294 *** (0.002)
  Business Services  0.467 *** (0.010)  0.308 *** (0.016)  0.288 *** (0.004)  0.415 *** (0.003)
  Social Services  0.222 *** (0.009)  0.032 * (0.017)  0.217 *** (0.004)  0.293 *** (0.003)
Location Variables
  Pusan -0.167 *** (0.004)  0.015 * (0.008) -0.071 *** (0.002) -0.073 *** (0.002)
  Kyunggi -0.059 *** (0.005)  0.006 (0.008) -0.030 *** (0.002) -0.043 *** (0.002)
  Kangwon,Choongchung,&Julla -0.222 *** (0.004) -0.021 ** (0.009) -0.080 *** (0.002) -0.112 *** (0.002)
  Kyungsang -0.130 *** (0.004)  0.041 *** (0.008) -0.019 *** (0.002) -0.050 *** (0.002)
Constant  7.098 *** (0.050)  8.616 *** (0.076)  7.781 *** (0.022)  8.187 *** (0.019)
Number of Observations  68,721  11,817  165,772  227,732
Adjusted R2
 0.472  0.474  0.511  0.525
 Statistically significant at the .10 level;  at the .05 level;  at the .01 level (two tailed tests).* ** ***
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Appendix Table 4.  (continued)
Year  1986  1989  1992
Time Input Variables
  Log Hours/Month  0.513 *** (0.003)  0.609 *** (0.018)  0.522 *** (0.015)
  Part-time -0.056 *** (0.006)  0.004 (0.030) -0.045 *** (0.017)
Education and Experience Variables
  Middle School  0.058 *** (0.002)  0.051 *** (0.009)  0.003 (0.008)
  High School  0.191 *** (0.002)  0.168 *** (0.010)  0.131 *** (0.009)
  Junior College  0.600 *** (0.004)  0.467 *** (0.016)  0.370 *** (0.012)
  College or Higher  0.851 *** (0.004)  0.683 *** (0.017)  0.601 *** (0.013)
  Experience (age-education-6)  0.022 *** (0.000)  0.014 *** (0.001)  0.014 *** (0.001)
  Experience Squared/100 -0.057 *** (0.001) -0.039 *** (0.002) -0.033 *** (0.002)
  Establishment-Specific Tenure  0.032 *** (0.000)  0.021 *** (0.002)  0.023 *** (0.001)
  Tenure Squared/100  0.002 (0.003)  0.071 *** (0.011)  0.034 *** (0.007)
  Years in Occupation 5-9 yrs  0.057 *** (0.002)  0.065 *** (0.007)  0.038 *** (0.006)
  Years in Occupation > 9 yrs  0.174 *** (0.004)  0.151 *** (0.014)  0.093 *** (0.010)
Occupation and Industry Variables
  Percent Female -0.067 *** (0.002) -0.050 *** (0.010) -0.095 *** (0.008)
  Supervisor  0.181 *** (0.005)  0.140 *** (0.020)  0.339 *** (0.022)
  Medium Firm  0.013 *** (0.002)  0.070 *** (0.008)  0.015 *** (0.005)
  Large Firm  0.068 *** (0.002)  0.134 *** (0.008)  0.055 *** (0.006)
  Mining  0.104 *** (0.008)  0.046 (0.037) -0.028 (0.069)
  Light Manufacturing 1  0.022 *** (0.003)  0.046 *** (0.010) -0.018 * (0.009)
  Heavy Manufacturing 1  0.011 *** (0.002)  0.048 *** (0.008) -0.016 ** (0.007)
  Heavy Manufacturing 2  0.020 *** (0.001)  0.056 *** (0.006) -0.015 *** (0.006)
  Utilities/Construction  0.112 *** (0.005)  0.075 *** (0.029)  0.053 *** (0.020)
  Commerce  0.166 *** (0.003)  0.154 *** (0.012)  0.048 *** (0.009)
  Transport/Storage/Communic.  0.179 *** (0.002)  0.034 ** (0.014)  0.022 (0.014)
  Business Services  0.239 *** (0.003)  0.026 ** (0.012)  0.118 *** (0.008)
  Social Services  0.222 *** (0.003)  0.225 *** (0.011)  0.119 *** (0.007)
Location Variables
  Pusan -0.095 *** (0.002) -0.057 *** (0.007) -0.047 *** (0.007)
  Kyunggi -0.053 *** (0.002)  0.012 * (0.006)  0.010 * (0.005)
  Kangwon,Choongchung,&Julla -0.117 *** (0.002) -0.058 *** (0.007) -0.057 *** (0.006)
  Kyungsang -0.074 *** (0.001)  0.029 *** (0.007)  0.008 (0.006)
Constant  8.897 *** (0.019)  8.835 *** (0.097)  9.908 *** (0.080)
Number of Observations  213,144  11,162  13,988
Adjusted R2  0.552  0.491  0.537
 Statistically significant at the .10 level;  at the .05 level;  at the .01 level (two tailed tests).* ** ***
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1. The direction of the law’s impact on relative earnings is not clear.  Equal opportunity
provisions should work to lower employment segregation by gender and improve women’s relative
earnings.  However, the law’s new maternity benefits to supplement those already in existence may
act as a tax on firms and cause them to lower women’s wages.  See Zveglich and Rodgers (1996) on
the impact of protective measures for female workers.
2. For example, see Bai and Cho (1992), Birdsall and Sabot (1991), Gannicott (1986), Kao,
Polachek, and Wunnava (1994), Lee (1991), and Lee and Lindauer (1991).  Zveglich, Rodgers, and
Rodgers (1995) is the only previous study to use the trend analysis to examine a developing country's
gender earnings differential, in this case Taiwan.
3. I dropped several other outliers where reported working hours exceeded the maximum
possible total, and where reported earnings far exceeded reported base earnings plus reported
overtime earnings.
4. I multiplied the reported earnings of these individuals by 1.2; no one reaches the top code in
other years.  I did not include bonuses in the construction of monthly earnings because data are
available only for annual bonus earnings.  Also, as reported in Ito and Kang (1989) and Lee and Rhee
(1996), bonuses are more sensitive to macroeconomic aggregates such as total corporate profits,
value added, and industrial output than are base earnings and overtime earnings.
5. The only exception is that the 1971 survey groups junior college and four-year college
graduates together.  In other years I control for this difference in educational attainment with separate
dummy variables in all the procedures except the trend decomposition.
6. Another drawback is that the surveys have a sampling bias toward younger workers in the
manufacturing sector (Kwark and Rhee, 1993, Kim and Topel, 1995).  The original tapes do not
provide sampling weights, and I did not attempt to reweight the data to correct for this limitation.
7. The survey codes the responses for educational attainment as a categorical variable.  In the
construction of potential experience, I approximate the following number of years of education for
each reported level of attainment: Primary and Below (6), Middle School (9), High School (12),
Junior College (14), and College and Above (17).
8. I cannot use years of occupation-specific tenure and its square because the survey codes the
responses as a categorical variable. 
9. The four manufacturing dummies are defined as follows: Light Manufacturing 1 includes
food, beverages, and tobacco; Light Manufacturing 2 includes textiles, apparel, and leather; Heavy
Manufacturing 1 includes wood, paper, chemicals, and non-metallic minerals; and Heavy
Manufacturing 2 includes iron, steel, fabricated metals, machinery, and equipment.
Endnotes
42
10. This method, which follows the approach in Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991), Blau and
Kahn (1992), and Rodgers (1993), is an alternative to the well known decomposition first used in
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973).  See Zveglich, Rodgers, and Rodgers (1995) for a discussion on
the difference between these two approaches.
11. Goldin (1990) has a thorough discussion on the use of male versus female coefficients.
12. Given the labor policy changes described in the introduction, 1986 also serves as a sensible
break point, and results are indeed similar when using 1971-86 and 1986-92 as alternative sub-
periods
13. I thank John Bauer for providing me with several of these descriptive statistics on female
attachment to the labor market.
14. For documentation of Korean labor laws see Republic of Korea (1992), and for discussion
of the equal opportunity law's enforcement, see The Economist, "The Battle of the Belly-button,
September 24, 1994, p. 39.
